# 1NC---Dartmouth RR---Round 2

## OFF

### OFF

#### NUCLEARISM K

#### Incremental adjustments to the nuclear arsenal framed to safeguard the world order from collapse are poison pills for global disarmament, merely serving to uphold the legitimacy of the nuclear order.

Egeland '22

policymakers argued the spread of nuc s was “accelerating” and that deterrence was becoming less effective far from strengthening disarmament, the op-eds restated the tenets of nuclear order disarmament is presented as long-term nonproliferation of “military” nuclear tech is presented as imperative for security On the precipice of a dangerous nuclear era the present are portrayed as uniquely dangerous assert the risk of nuc s being used is rising New races and tech are forever just around the corner Decade after decade no-first use are upheld as solutions to “revitalize” disarmament these seek to incrementally reduce nuc s while ensuring the legitimacy of deterrence those within the order identify the present as dangerous, but refrain from embracing disarmament. Yet the “pragmatic” approach not only failed to deliver results this played a key role in producing the unacceptable present is often framed as so distant that virtually any policy can be said to support or oppose it Japan’s rejection was based on the government’s assertion “that this time differs from our approach aimed at ‘a world free of nuc s

#### The alternative divests from the rules of the nuclear order by contesting the state's ability to decide how and when it can control its arsenal, unconditionally stigmatizing the very existence of nuclear weapons.

Egeland '22

The subversive potential of the TPNW owes to the movement’s clash with rules of order the movement contest powers’ entitlement to possess nuc s also their right to determine how and when treaties are negotiated Ideology resides in (in)action the TPNW subverted the nuclear order’s rule that rights” of states should not be challenged the TPNW light the nuclear-armed states hostility to change and on the practices that keep the s quo in pace the first gesture of liberation is to force the master to act as one Adopting an unconditional ban on nuclear arms the TPNW contest the order and build a new vision of politics the TPNW disturbed existing power stigmatization has merit bring the fault lines underpinning the order to the fore. Acknowledging these remains a prerequisite for any change

#### Moving toward the radical vision of a world without nukes is necessary and urgent to build bridges between a cohort of issues like militarist violence, colonialism, and biospherical destruction---those categorically outweigh case.

Ritchie '22

a rejection of nuclearism articulates a different ontology’ of what counts in politics that reflects subordinated peoples in the structure of hegemony resistance frames nuc s as oppressive and disarmament as necessary based on equality and rights it frames disarmament as an ideological contestation it connects a world without nuc s to this world a possibility that nuclearism dismiss as implausible foregrounds nuclear violence against bodies and societies as unacceptable politics is predicated upon reproducing inequality, exclusion and violence’ an explicit connection between nuclearism and imperialism, racism, and injustice the discourse foregrounds imperialism in terms of injustices and harms This centres on states subjected to testing investment in nuclear weapons is a direct opportunity cost to international development the existence place the sustainable agenda at risk because of the effects that detonations have on the UN S D G s Disarmament prevent war and releas resources for development The environmental dimension foregrounds the hazards of contamination from weapons programmes and detonations The long-term effects are central pollution of atmospheric, groundwater and soil environments from testing persist nuclearisation is framed in terms of hyper-masculinity and an extreme expression of militarism is a different ontology to one that centres on weapons, states, deterrence

### OFF

#### COURT CURBING CP

#### The United States Congress should unanimously pass a resolution threatening the judiciary if it does not require that the United States adopt an operational nuclear no-first-use policy.

#### Curbing threats ensure compliance and deter strike down of Biden’s agenda.

Block ’20

after Roosevelt proposal Court stopped overturning programs Court proved susceptible to pressure In no instance did Congress truly enact laws In each Court changed anyway Historically Court gets the message Biden have to contend with six conservatives proposals to curb put the fear of God in judges Roberts A C A vote was institutional Roberts takes threats seriously

#### Unrestrained conservative majority destroys the admin state.

Coffee ’22

Court’s conservative wing moving at a rapid pace to dismantle the Admin State Court has taken significant steps a fast pace Much depends on swing-vote of Roberts Kavanaugh and Barrett president is challenged and vulnerable agencies may soon have very confined discretion that does not allow them to address most significant issues climate change pandemic, and economy

#### The admin state prevents extinction.

Collier ’21

we live in vulnerable world disease weak financial accidents attacks on systems climate vulnerability of systems on which life depends single mutation away from causing a deadly pandemic administrative devices mitigate vulnerability laid out strategy of preparedness for disasters blackouts terror attacks They drew on expert coordination planning across agencies systems required to sustain life from nuclear attack “administrative readiness” a vast range of functions welfare econ and industrial powers as “admin state.”

### OFF

#### CMR DA

#### Nuclear restraint triggers acute backlash from the Pentagon.

Bender ’21

pledge to limit the role of nuclear weapons is facing resistance from Pentagon and hawkish allies, who are arguing to keep the s quo China’s expansion alongside Russia’s modernization strengthened the hand of leaders who oppose any changes or cuts to atomic weapons Biden will put his own stamp on nuclear strategy policy is a presidential-level decision veterans see a tough road Biden decided to withdraw from Afghanistan despite misgivings But in this situation, to change policy, Biden would have to overrule Pentagon, at the Strat Com

#### Rapid and unpredictable shifts in military policy cause a civil-military whiplash---destroys effective cooperation and escalates every existential threat.

Golby ‘21

Biden will want processes that provide greater civilian direction Biden will need to provid military officers a voice in the process C m r provide effective national security policies in context of democratic accountability great-power conflict instability in Mid East strained ties with allies prolif terrorism, failed states, and ethnic rivalries pandemic economic upheaval neglect of civil-military file would impose intolerable costs

### OFF

#### CHADHA CP

#### The United States federal government should create, fully fund, and deploy a globally cooperative directed-energy boost-phase missile defense program.

#### By majority vote, the United States Senate, endorsed by the United States federal judiciary, ought to ban an operational nuclear no-first-use policy.

#### A global defensive grid of directed-energy satellites shoots down any ballistic missile---it’s the only way to guard against otherwise-inevitable deterrence failures, wars, or accidental launches.

Nayak '17

Space defense can change deterrence at global levels US should invest in global, defensive, space-based directed energy grid to co-target nuclear and ASAT threats We think MAD has worked but can never know until it fails. We have even less confidence against rogue s. It fails to protect from accidental unauthorized launch a terrorist would not hesitate m a d cannot remain sole model No Ko and Iran, are seeking nuclear ICBM) tech instability between Pakistan and India can lead to nuclear use that could draw nations in MAD relies on reliable arsenal in question as every leg of the US' triad is aging China began pursuing ASAT tech Russia demonstrated interest We propose a global, distributed satellite grid hosting low-power directed energy beam for global space superiority each beam by itself will be incapable of kinetic effect co-targeting would raise power to destructive level This would target any projectile ICBM SLBM) or ASAT

#### The counterplan has one chamber of Congress retake authority over nuclear use, overturning *INS v. Chadha*.

Shultz ‘4

Congress has the authority to control first-use. Even if Congress chooses not the president does not have authority to make first-use of nuc s absent congress Chadha rejected a "legislative veto" to review action the veto was widespread effective and efficient The time is ripe to set up congress where president does not have plenary power Congress must authoriz

#### *Chadha* shredded restraint on emergency power---degrades democracy domestically and emboldens global autocrats to aggrandize power.

Parker '23

Emergency powers are both necessary and dangerous Trump considered using emergency to seize voting machines following his defeat autocrats invoke emergencies to aggrandize power emergency powers kindle emergencies INS v. Chadha dealt a major blow to Congress’s ability to police use of emergency powers the Court gave the president veto power over emergency terminations making emergencies “easy to declare and hard to stop Chadha weakened the NEA as a guardrail against abuses

#### Democracy plugs risks from pandemics, climate change, and AI---but unleashing emergency powers magnifies them.

Belfield '23

totalitarian states risk extinction bad at dealing with disasters more likely to have major wars Miscalc might be a problem due to personalization and disincentives for accurate info makes extinction likely, by raising the chance of w m d s totalitarian s are less cooperative lack of transparency limits agreements bad for pandemics climate change emergency powers secure A totalitarian-dominated world order totalitarian world extend risk of extinction, as well as distortion of the human trajectory which threaten destruction of humanity’s potential

### OFF

#### ASSURANCES DA

#### Biden is assuaging allied concerns about China with consultations and formalized promises that the U.S. is ready and willing to use nukes---the plan's flip-flop causes Seoul to either upscale nuclear development or demand re-deployment of TNWs to the Peninsula---causes regional arms racing and implodes the alliance network which is an impact filter for all other ex-risks.

Katz '23

Korea building nuc s or asking the U S to deploy t n w s concerned about Washington’s deterrence maintaining cred requires convincing allies not just the U S has the capabilities but also will to use baseline doubt is normal however threats from No Ko China, and Russia created challenges Seoul worry the U S is either unwilling to address allies are concerned about developments in the U S that downgrade alliances Seoul wonder whether Washington will remain committed The U S reassuring them of security commitments Biden reiterated the commitment to defend with nuclear weapons elevated dialogues some argue Washington shouldn’t bother trying to salvage deterrence Korea could develop its own quickly and with the support of its public Such points rarely acknowledge a program introduce a nuclear arms race strain alliance alliances manag China climate pandemics, and supply chain problems that cannot be handled by one alone the U S need to continue shoring up deterrence

#### Assurance loss causes overwhelming pressure for TNW re-deployment---that causes arms races with China, Japan, and North Korea that go nuclear.

Dalton '21

Korean parties call to redeploy t n w s they would repair perceived damage to extended deterrence These tend to be dismissed in Washington frustration regarding consultations speak to cred deficit. Calls reflect anxieties plausible developments would force difficult choices between alliance management and nonprolif to rebuild cred dampen interest in redeployment If Biden adjust policy, it may face requests for countervailing forward deployment assurance gains would be outweighed by wide-ranging risks t n w s provoke a arms race with China whose consequences worsen conflict escalation No Ko respond by its own battlefield nuc s increasing risks of use in even limited scenarios Redeploying stymie negotiations Korean-Japanese disputes could deepen nonprolif globally would be set back. Russia, China, would use deployment as a wedge issue to frustrate policy in the N P T also provide a excuse to eschew arms control

## Case

### AT: Nuclear Use ADV---1AC

1. No scenario for war. We get new answers or assign the risk of case extremely low because they haven’t isolated who escalates when.

#### 2. Controlled studies refute the commitment trap.

Smetana '23

there was no difference between approval in the control and ambiguous threat group We reject that leaders suffer domestic disapproval when they make ambiguous nuclear threats and back down public disapproval is higher if the leaders employ nu s after an ambiguous nuclear threat than if they do not. there was no association between preference for nuclear use and the ambiguous or explicit threat the public is not attentive to the implicit hint at nuclear use in ambiguous messaging

#### 3. Miscalculated war is bunk.

Quackenbush ’23

There is a divide between accidental war in models and lit central is that something inadvertent results in war purely by chance, without choice No war occurred in this manner, so no cases correspond in stark contrast to discussions This adds the leader’s choice no war is accidental mistaken warning seems to be about incomplete info The only way for monitoring to affect likelihood is making info complete Info can affect the likelihood leaders choose war,but will not affect war from chance Incomplete info is already accounted for both logic and evidence contradict accidental war

### AT: HSWs ADV---1AC

#### 1. Hypersonics are the squo.

Parlato '23

In February the Multi-Domain Task Force deployed the Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon a full rehearsal of hypersonic capabilities deployment exercised critical linkages

#### More are coming.

Bugos '22

After testing the Defense Department is on schedule to deploy its first new hypersonic weapon The Army completed delivery LRHW is one of 24 the Army plans to deploy

#### 3. Even if deployed, there’s no impact---the threat’s low and manageable without strategic shifts

Raitasalo 19

“hypersonic hype” is flooded with buzzwords remember (RMA)? never materialized Similarly, Cyberwar not one instance no ev suggest basic logic related to defence change radically hypersonic s will not revolutionize First U S ill remain second to none for decades U S has a broad repertoire of responses even if it lagged to think any weapon is an existential threat is unrealistic scenarios ignore one’s own efforts missiles will not turn usable en masse history is no U-turns deterrence should not be underestimated a stretch to imagine any regime so suicidal it would even think to use not a silver bullet they are not important

#### Constraints check.

Bitzinger 19

China is driving concerns over hypersonics pump the brakes not *the* big thing physics is a cruel mistress a operational weapon is years off current systems are proof-of-concept invincibility is not destined ICBMs are hypersonic but defenses developed DF-21 “carrier killer,” were exaggerated faddism should not drive acquisition remember New Coke

#### 4. US won’t deploy even if they solve warhead ambiguity.

Brustlein 15

projects suffer from reliance on tech not yet mature, particularly HGVs requirements are extremely ambitious Congress ruled out CTM any CPGS required advances in hypersonic flight a HGV poses numerous difficulties conditions for stable gliding flight are poorly understood test costs are prohibitive shielding the payload from heat constitutes a challenge guidance systems seem inadequate

#### 5. No China war.

Thornton 22

restraints promote prosperity for 70 years they prevent conflict accidents would not lead to war diplomacy forestall misperceptions leaders communicate network of institutions have a stake every government would prevent conflict through mediation, or resistance globalization makes war unwinnable Politicians cannot ignore voters public is wary the press perform watchdog function

#### 6. No Taiwan invasion

Medeiros 21

myths Xi is set to invade a misreading of calculus and current situation China view Taiwan as political not military consistent preference has been to deter rather than compel unification Even in rising tensions, there is little ev Xi is anxious and preparing invasion he never set a deadline Invading remains extraordinarily risky in the next years at a crucial time for Xi’s domestic agenda that could short-circuit Even if invasion succeeded, China have to occupy gutting econ calculus remains complex far from a “no-brainer.”

#### Or SCS escalation!

Bo 20

neither have much other than peaceful coexistence conflict is fanciful Considering both are nuclear feasibility greatly diminished rivalry in S C S is growing, but war is some way off. There are several encounters every day Most professional and safe both sides remained restrained neither increased activity compared with 19, despite media reports